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Abstract 
 
This article examines the use of limitation laws in the context of civil 
law claims under English law and Scots law brought by adult  
claimants in relation to allegations of historical abuse in childhood. 
Using case law as a barometer of judicial attitudes towards such 
claimants and, by extension, towards the child victims of abuse 
themselves, differences in judicial approach between the two 
jurisdictions are critically assessed, entailing some weighing and 
evaluation of the argumentative coherence and persuasive force of 
the judicial decision-making in question. Key aspects of the discussion 
are framed in terms of recurrent issues that have arisen in relevant 
case law. The overall aim is to inform a wider debate about the 
success or failure of civil law mechanisms of redress in rendering 
justice to those whose right to emotional, physical, psychological or 
sexual integrity has been violated in childhood. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
It is a truism that law, whether of the judicial or legislative kind, often 
leads or lags behind prevailing climates of public opinion. So, when 
the judiciary or the legislature is not acting as a corrective to the 
other, either may, sooner or later, find it necessary to realign the law 
in a way that represents the best, and most faithfully captured, 
discernment of the will of the community or of prevailing social 
policy. 
 
One illustration of the tendency of law to play catch-up in this way 
has come from a surprising quarter in the recent past. Civil limitation 
laws may not ordinarily be thought to be a natural context for the 
development of significant legal rights. Such laws are,  rather, 
normally highly technical and, being adjectival in nature, are removed 
from the usual arenas in which key substantive rights are contested, 
restated or refined. Yet, during at least the last decade in the UK, 
there have been important developments in limitation laws so far as 
applicable to civil law claims brought by adults in respect of 
allegations of historical abuse occurring in childhood. This appears to 
have been in response to growing public awareness of the problem  
of childhood abuse generally and a steady increase – not only in the 
UK, but in countries such as Australia, Canada, the Republic of Ireland 
and the USA – in the volume of adult personal injury claims being 
pursued in relation to such allegations. Needless to say, the fact that 
typically such claims take many years to come to court has often 
ensured that the claims have become time-barred; and this has in 
turn led to the operation and effect of civil limitation laws frequently 
taking centre stage in claims of this kind. The resultant case law is 
often to be regarded as a first port of call in any  review of  the civil 
law ramifications of historical childhood abuse. 
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What is immediately striking when reflecting upon the emergent case 
law both north and south of the border – including the specifics of 
judicial opinions and decisions – is that the true nature of civil law 
claims brought by adults in respect of allegations of historical abuse  
is not always in plain view. Essentially and fundamentally they are 
claims centring upon violated children’s rights – in other words, rights 
of the child to emotional, physical, psychological and sexual integrity 
and (secondary) rights of action in relation to violations of those 
(primary) rights. The fact that everyone has comparable rights  
possibly places violations, whether of rights of children or of adults, 
on a par with one another, disregarding considerations of whether 
the special vulnerability of children, and their presumed moral claim 
to an enhanced level of legal protection, should call for special 
treatment in the judicial setting. Thus, implicit in the case law is a 
kind of postponed protestation of (child) victimhood which the status 
of claimants as adults in some way serves to mask. For, the idea that 
more often than not in the past – and particularly in the recent past – 
children have become reliant upon their “adult selves” to seek civil 
law redress, obscures the fact that relevant rights of redress have 
originally accrued in childhood, only to be belatedly taken up and 
pursued, often unsuccessfully, in adulthood. Judges and others 
typically (and perhaps inevitably) view these claims as, in a sense, live 
“adult claims” rather than postponed “child claims”. 
 
Yet the tendency for victims or “survivors” of historical childhood 
abuse1 to seek civil law redress in adulthood reflects, among other 
things, the realities of historically abusive environments that, 
typically, have been too threatening or intimidating or unsupportive 
for effective action (legal or otherwise) to be taken by, or on behalf 
 
1 Adult victims of historical childhood abuse commonly refer to themselves as “survivors” of 
abuse. In this article, “victim” and “survivor” (and also “sufferer”) are used interchangeably. 
On the use of the expression “survivor” see, for example, The Scottish Human Rights 
Commission (2013, p. 2, n. 1). 
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of, a child (or even a young adult) at a more appropriate time. At the 
same time, victims have usually been too disempowered – and often, 
in sexual abuse cases, too guilt-ridden or “silenced” – to take such 
timely action. 
 
Over and above all of this is the innate fragility of children’s rights 
where, even in the context of theoretical or philosophical debates 
about the nature of rights, there are long-established and still current 
strands of debate questioning the very existence and possibility of 
children’s rights, with the result that there is no informed consensus 
about whether children can possess legal or moral rights at all 
(Campbell, 1992, p. 2; MacCormick, 1982, pp. 154–166). That may in 
itself contribute to a situation where perceptions of children’s rights 
take as their point of departure a relatively low baseline in which  
such rights, or purported rights, cannot simply be presumed before a 
discussion of their content can ensue; they may need to be “set up” 
or argued for. 
 
Of course, some may see this as a relatively esoteric debate, and for 
that reason I shall make the working (and practical) assumption, for 
purposes of the discussion to follow, that children are indeed 
possessed of legal and moral rights and that this is to be taken as  
read in the context of civil law claims brought by adults in respect of 
allegations of historical childhood abuse. After all, the courts are 
necessarily involved in prima facie engagement with such claims on 
the basis that, in a given case, a claim proceeds from allegations that 
established (and usually undisputed) legal rights to emotional or 
physical or psychological or sexual integrity – for example, a right not 
to be sexually assaulted – have been violated. But the “charge” of 
fragility of rights of the child persists if for no other reason than that 
the exercise and enforcement of such rights – particularly rights of 
younger children – are often dependent upon the intervention of an 
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adult representative, such as a parent or guardian or carer.  
Inevitably, in specific cases, that may serve to weaken or undermine 
the rights in question even if the converse may also be true in cases 
where a child’s representative is diligent in upholding, maintaining 
and reinforcing the relevant rights. 
 
The (on the face of it, improbable) fact that civil limitation case law 
has become a repository of judicial decision-making on some civil law 
ramifications of historical childhood abuse has meant that it has 
become possible, when reviewing such case law (as this has been 
developing over more than a decade under English law and Scots 
law), to identify judicial attitudes towards adult claimants in historical 
childhood abuse cases and, by extension, towards child abuse victims 
themselves. (This is despite jurisdictional differences at the level of 
the detail of statutory provisions and judicial opinions.) The case law 
in both jurisdictions has become a kind of barometer, or better, a 
prism, through which to view legal (including, more narrowly,  
judicial) policy in this area, and to observe and take stock of relevant 
developments and associated judicial attitudes and perspectives. 
 
In this article it is intended to focus attention, among other things, 
upon the relevant case law. This will entail, where appropriate, 
identifying judicial opinions that afford some insight into contrasting 
judicial attitudes in both English and Scots law towards adult 
claimants in historical childhood abuse cases and towards the child 
victims of abuse. Key aspects of the discussion to  follow are framed 
in terms of recurrent issues that have arisen in the context  of 
relevant judicial opinions. The overall aim is to outline a position that 
may serve to inform a wider debate about the success or failure of 
civil law mechanisms of redress in rendering justice, or towards 
delivering even a sense of justice, to those whose right to emotional, 
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physical, psychological or sexual integrity has been violated in 
childhood. 
 
2 A Preliminary Overview – English Law and Scots Law 
 
 
As an essential preliminary to the lines of analysis pursued  later in 
this article, it is necessary to undertake a brief contextual overview of 
the current position in the UK, considering respectively English law 
and Scots law, including recent key developments, both in the judicial 
context and under statute, in and in the use of, civil limitation laws in 
historical childhood abuse cases. 
 
Turning first to English law, civil limitation laws in principle apply to 
delayed personal injury claims arising from allegations of childhood 
abuse, though an English House of Lords case (A v Hoare [2008] 1 AC 
844) (hereafter, “Hoare”) and subsequent cases – when combined 
with the discretion provided for in section 33 of the Limitation Act 
1980 to disapply the three-year limitation period where it is 
“equitable” to do so – have served to lessen the time-barring impact 
of the use of limitation laws in such contexts. Lately, Hoare has paved 
the way for the use of the section 33 discretion in cases involving 
deliberately inflicted injury where, prior to that decision, an earlier 
House of Lords decision (Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498 HL(E)) – 
which Hoare departs from – had in error laid down that the  
discretion was not available in cases of deliberate injury. Given that  
in childhood abuse cases injuries are frequently deliberately inflicted, 
the decision in Hoare has resulted in an increase in the successful use 
of the section 33 discretion in relevant civil law claims and 
correspondingly favourable outcomes for claimants. (Prior to that,  
the Stubbings decision had effectively suppressed many such cases.) 
 
Also, since Hoare, the courts appear to have aimed to strike a better 
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balance between the respective interests of parties suing and parties 
sued in historical childhood abuse cases.2 However, unlike 
jurisdictions such as Scotland, and Australian states including 
Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria, which have recently 
introduced relevant legislation, no legislation has yet been enacted in 
England and Wales specifically disapplying civil limitation laws in 
childhood abuse personal injury claims; though, since the decision in 
Hoare – and indeed case law that has recognised the availability of 
vicarious liability in such claims, such as in Catholic Child Welfare 
Society and others v The Institute of the Brothers of the Christian 
Schools [2012] UKSC 5 – the courts appear to have adopted a 
generally more lenient approach to the disposal of such claims. 
 
The position under Scots law differs markedly from the English law 
position. In 2015 the Scottish Government initiated a public 
consultation on a proposal to remove the 3-year limitation period in 
personal injury claims initiated by adults in connection with 
allegations of historical childhood abuse (see The Scottish 
Government, 2015). The consultation was in response to a growing 
perception that the civil courts in Scotland were adopting an overly 
strict approach to applying civil limitation laws in the context of such 
claims. Hand in hand with this was a perception that judges were 
generally antipathetic towards the merits of claims in such cases. For 
instance, under section 19A of the Prescription and Limitation 
(Scotland) Act 1973, the court is invested with a discretionary power 
to allow an otherwise time-barred action to proceed if it deems it 
“equitable” to do so. (The section 19A discretion is broadly  
equivalent to the English law section 33 discretion.) Commenting on 
the use of this discretion, and on the fact that in childhood abuse 
 
 
2 For instance, see B and others v Nugent Care Society/R v Wirral Metropolitan Borough 
Council [2010] 1 WLR 516, especially at paras. [20]–[27] (Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony 
MR). 
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cases the discretion had, at the time of writing, rarely been invoked 
successfully, Eleanor Russell has observed: 
 
It seems difficult to resist the conclusion that a hardening of 
judicial approach is discernible in relation to the equitable 
discretion. The courts are increasingly focussing attention on 
the fundamental rationale of limitation statutes, namely that 
the rules serve the public interest, and that any derogation 
from the basic rule is exceptional and requires a compelling 
justification. In the absence of a compelling excuse on the 
pursuer’s part, it would appear that the rules of limitation will 
normally prevail. (Russell, 2013, pp. 125–126) 
 
This was doubtless a case of law – or, at any rate, judicial decision- 
making – at best, lagging behind public opinion or, at worst arguably 
denying justice to a seemingly deserving class of litigants. 
 
The Scottish Government consultation has resulted in the enactment 
of the Limitation (Childhood Abuse) (Scotland) Act 2017 which 
became effective on 4 October 2017. The Act disapplies civil  
limitation laws in the context of personal injury claims arising from 
allegations of childhood sexual abuse, physical abuse, emotional 
abuse and abuse in the form of neglect. In other words, the 3-year 
time bar in principle ceases to apply in such claims. However, in order 
to safeguard the position of the party sued in the context of such 
claims, the Act also establishes significant new grounds of challenge 
which have the potential to reanimate the previously established 
trend for the courts to apply civil limitation laws strictly in the context 
of childhood abuse claims. In terms of a new section 17D(2) of the 
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 – the 1973 Act being 
the primary legislation modified by the 2017 Act – the court may 
disallow an action (such as one centring on allegations of abuse in 
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childhood) ‘where the … [party sued] satisfies the court that it is not 
possible for a fair hearing to take place’. Over and above the section 
17D(2) ground of challenge, a further provision (a new section 17D(3) 
of the 1973 Act) empowers the court to disallow (e.g. a historical 
childhood abuse) action if the party sued satisfies the court that as a 
result of civil limitation laws (i.e. the 3-year time bar)  being  
disapplied ‘the … [party sued] would be substantially prejudiced were 
the action to proceed’ and ‘having had regard to the … interest [of 
the suing party] in the action proceeding, the court is satisfied that 
the prejudice is such that the action should not proceed’. There is a 
well-established “jurisprudence” in Scots case law of safeguarding, 
and therefore in effect promoting, the interests of the party sued in 
this type of case which the courts may fall back on when considering 
future challenges made under sections 17D(2) or 17D(3) (or both). 
There is, in other words, a well-trodden judicial path of “looking out 
for” or “taking care of” the party sued, in terms of fairness of the 
proceedings and avoidance of prejudice. It is thus clear, as Russell has 
noted (see above), that the established case law has more often than 
not resulted in the courts giving primacy to the position and interests 
of the party sued. It has yet to be seen whether the strict judicial 
approach established in previous case law will be extended to the 
construction and application of the new sections 17D(2) and 17D(3) 
grounds of challenge. 
 
An Australian case has often cited by the Scottish courts in the 
context of childhood abuse claims where the operation of the 3-year 
time bar has arisen for discussion (Brisbane South Regional Health 
Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541, especially at 551–553). In 
particular, the opinion of McHugh J has proved highly influential in 
judicial decision-making under Scots law (and to a lesser extent 
English law), where, among other rationales for civil limitation laws, 
emphasis is given to the problem of deterioration of evidence over 
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time, sometimes expressed as the judicial imperative to resist “stale 
claims”.3 
 
With the seemingly more lenient operation of civil limitation laws in 
England and Wales since Hoare – including developments in the 
availability of vicarious liability – and the recently introduced 
legislative regime in Scotland, it might have been thought that the 
civil law claims of victims of historical childhood abuse in the UK 
would be less likely to encounter the time-barring effect of limitation 
laws. However, despite the altogether more lenient position to have 
emerged under English law there is an ever-present possibility that 
civil limitation laws may be strictly applied in the context of relevant 
claims. In the absence of legislation disapplying civil limitation laws in 
historical childhood abuse cases this relative lack of certainty is likely 
to continue for the foreseeable future. Yet, ironically, the position 
under Scots law might be no less certain going forward despite the 
evidently more permissive and apparently forgiving legislative regime 
for adult historical abuse claimants given that the 2017 Act has, in 
effect as we have seen, created independent new grounds of 
objection to the progress of relevant claims specifically focused on 
childhood abuse cases. What this means is that, under English law 
and Scots law, not only is there a continuing risk that relevant claims 
may be forestalled by limitation laws, but the previously developed 
case law embodying judicial attitudes towards both adult claimants in 
historical childhood abuse cases and child abuse victims themselves 
 
 
3 In a variety of key respects, the appropriateness of each of McHugh J’s rationales for civil 
limitation laws, when viewed in the context of civil law claims brought by adults in respect of 
allegations of historical abuse occurring in childhood, is questionable (see generally Ross, 
2018). Case law – in most cases peremptorily and uncritically – citing Brisbane includes: B v 
Murray (No 2) 2005 SLT 982, especially at para. [22]–[28] (Lord Drummond Young); M v 
O'Neill 2006 SLT 823, especially at para. [96] (Lord Glennie); AS v Poor Sisters of Nazareth 
2007 SC 688, especially at paras. [41]–[45] (Lord President Hamilton); Bowden v Poor Sisters 
of Nazareth and Others [2008] UKHL 32, especially at paras. [5] and [23]–[25] (Lord Hope of 
Craighead); Vincent Roland Albonetti v Metropolitan Borough of Wirral [2008] EWHC 3523 
(QB), especially at para. [18] (McKinnon J); and F, S v TH [2016] EWHC 1605 (QB), especially 
at para. [12] (Langstaff J). 
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(particularly in Scotland) may to some extent serve as an indicator of 
how relevant claims might be decided by the courts in future. 
 
In the recent past in the UK relevant judicial attitudes have been 
developing in a context in which judges occasionally have, but 
frequently have not, factored into account the unique difficulties and 
complexities arising from the (historical) lived experiences of 
childhood abuse sufferers which, in adulthood, are often manifested 
in a range of medically recognised conditions. There is, for instance, 
no lack of evidence for the psychologically paralysing and 
incapacitating effects of certain forms of childhood abuse on adult 
survivors. So it is instructive to examine briefly a few of the 
recognised effects of childhood abuse at this stage of the discussion. 
 
3 Recognised Effects of Childhood Abuse 
 
 
The fact that, in general, childhood abuse – and  particularly 
childhood sexual abuse – impacts in a variety of injurious ways upon 
the psychology and quality of life of victims in adulthood is widely 
recognised and extensively reported upon in literature in the areas of 
psychiatry, psychology, sociology and other medical and behavioural 
sciences. Commenting in the opening paragraph of a study published 
in 1995 – which focuses on childhood sexual abuse – Smucker et al 
point out that, in the previous decade, a growing body of literature 
had attested to an alarming prevalence of childhood sexual abuse 
and its deleterious effects on the lives of adult survivors. 
 
Numerous studies have indicated that a history of childhood 
sexual abuse is associated with psychological difficulties in 
adulthood, such as increased rates of chronic depression, 
suicidality and self-destructive behaviors, interpersonal and 
sexual  difficulties,  chronic  anxiety,  and  posttraumatic stress 
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disorder. Feelings of guilt, self-blame, self-disgust, self-hatred, 
low self-esteem, inferiority and powerlessness, and mistrust 
of others are frequently cited in the clinical literature as long- 
term effects of sexual abuse … . (Smucker et al., 1995, p. 4) 
 
Another study (Cutajar et al., 2010) has maintained that the victims 
of childhood sexual abuse suffer three times the burden of mental 
health problems when compared with members of the general 
community. The authors of the study conclude that such abuse 
increases the risk of the subsequent development of psychiatric 
disorders in both childhood and adulthood. Individual studies 
focusing on childhood abuse in institutional environments – where 
abusive treatment has often been on a wider spectrum than sexual 
abuse (i.e. extending to physical and emotional abuse, and also 
neglect) – have reached broadly similar conclusions. Thus, in a study 
undertaken in the context of the Ryan Commission’s investigation of 
child abuse in the Irish industrial and reformatory school system 
(Ryan, 2009, para. [3.30]), effects of childhood abuse have included, 
in addition to many of the issues or medical conditions outlined 
above, relationship and parenting problems, and occupational and 
health difficulties. 
 
More tellingly – at least so far as the present discussion is concerned 
– in a number of studies, patterns of behaviour have been observed 
that are relevant to an assessment of specific legal implications of  
the psychological sequelae of childhood abuse – enabling, in 
particular, connections to be made between childhood abuse and 
(subsequent) delays in victims’ seeking civil law redress. Thus, the 
authors of a study focusing on childhood incest point to the fact that 
therapists have often encountered adult clients only after the  
passage of many years since the clients’ experiences of abuse 
(Lindberg and Distad, 1985, pp. 332–333). A severe trauma such as 
13  
childhood incest is typically followed by the emergence of a pattern 
of repression, denial and emotional avoidance – this being the so- 
called latency period characteristic of childhood abuse. At a later 
stage, symptoms such as nightmares or guilt may be experienced. 
Moreover, as Lindberg and Distad note, adult survivors are known to 
suppress or conceal their childhood victimisation through learned 
“survival skills” or because they did not know that the difficulties or 
symptoms with which they presented to therapists were linked to 
their historical experiences of incest. 
 
These findings have been reinforced in observations made by the Law 
Commission for England and Wales in a report focusing, among other 
things, on the legal implications of delay in the context of civil law 
claims arising from allegations of childhood abuse (Law Commission, 
2001, para. 3.103). Commenting on the inhibiting  and  delaying 
effects of childhood abuse on the pursuit of civil law redress, the 
report points to cases where it had taken more than two decades for 
victims to testify about abuse on account of the traumatic memories 
that that would revive. The report notes that there is a need for 
victims to recover sufficiently from the trauma occasioned by 
childhood abuse to be able to contemplate bringing a claim against 
alleged abusers. 
 
A case decided in Queensland, Australia (Carter v Corporation of the 
Sisters of Mercy of the Diocese of Rockhampton [2001] QCA 335; 
BC200104983), is one of a number to have given judicial recognition 
to the difficulties faced by adult survivors of childhood abuse in 
pursuing timely civil  law redress.4  In  Carter the majority decision  of 
 
4 In a Scottish case (CG v Glasgow City Council [2009] CSOH 34, at para. [32]) – a single-judge 
decision that was subsequently overruled – Lord Malcolm, sitting in the Outer House of the 
Court of Session, commented that the claimant, despite knowing that in some sense she had 
suffered abuse, failed to appreciate that her experiences justified seeking advice as to the 
options available to her for pursuing civil law redress: ‘It is I think widely understood that 
young people who suffer this form of ill-treatment on a regular basis can come to regard it 
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the court was that a civil law claim alleging childhood abuse was 
time-barred. However, in support of the claimant’s position, Atkinson 
J (dissenting) observed that adult survivors of abuse characteristically 
lack self-esteem and self-confidence, contributing to a situation 
where the psychologically incapacitating effects of abuse do not 
emerge until many years into adulthood. She further observed that 
these severe long-term consequences of abuse have been known to 
manifest themselves in an inability of victims to recognise the true 
nature of the abuse.5 Inevitably, at least for some adult survivors of 
historical abuse, the initiation of timely civil law redress may be, and 
may have been, impossible. 
 
In a similar vein, a consultation paper published by the Scottish 
Government (The Scottish Government, 2012, para. [3.25])  notes 
that severe and prolonged abuse of children can have a traumatic 
and psychologically paralysing effect, inhibiting the pursuit of civil law 
redress in adulthood. (This was five years before the government’s 
law reform agenda had developed sufficiently to make the 
introduction of legislation in the form of the Limitation (Childhood 
Abuse) (Scotland) Act 2017 Act a reality.) The consultation paper 
emphasises that the practical capacity to initiate legal proceedings 
may actually be absent in such circumstances, and points out that it 
would seem “hard” if survivors of abuse, when they emerge  from 
their state of effective incapacity and seek to pursue civil law redress, 
find that the law no longer provides them with any avenue to take 
action. However, echoing judicial decisions previously made in the 
Scottish courts – and in so doing alluding to the primacy more often 
than not given in those courts to the position of the party sued – the 
 
 
as almost part and parcel of their way of life, and that it can have devastating consequences 
thereafter which may make it difficult for them to appreciate or discover the significance of 
what had been done to them’. For the subsequent Inner House decision, see CG v Glasgow 
City Council 2011 SC 1. 
5 Carter at paras. [86] and [88]. 
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consultation paper also stresses the need for the rights of alleged 
wrongdoers to be safeguarded, commenting that allegations need to 
be tested within a reasonable time period rather than many years or 
decades after the occurrence of the alleged wrongdoing (The Scottish 
Government, 2012, paras. [3.26] and [3.27]). With the creation of 
independent grounds of objection to the progress of relevant claims 
provided for in the 2017 Act (mentioned above), it is clear that the 
Scottish Government’s fundamental position did not change 
significantly between 2012 and 2017. 
 
4 Judicial Opinions Evidencing Contrasting Judicial Attitudes 
under English Law and Scots Law 
 
We have seen that not only is there recognition of the psychologically 
paralysing effects of childhood abuse in clinical and other literature; 
but relevant findings have been reinforced in specifically legal 
literature, whether judicial sources (i.e. case law) or reports of bodies 
involved in developing legal policy, such as governmental and law 
reform sources. It so happens that none of this has resulted in any 
kind of general alignment of positions developed by the judiciary 
separately under, respectively, English law and Scots law though, of 
course, at appropriate points, as with other areas of the law, the laws 
of both jurisdictions to some extent influence and impact upon each 
other. But nothing in the nature of a uniform approach has emerged 
across the case law of the two jurisdictions. Inevitably, this is  
accountable to differences in the detail of relevant legislative 
provisions, and other key variations in the law; but doubtless judicial 
attitudes and cultures have played a role in this as well. 
 
The discussion to follow takes the form of a review of a selection of 
leading cases and other sources. The cases in question illustrate key 
recurrent issues that have arisen for discussion in judicial opinions 
16  
deciding upon the applicability of civil limitation laws in adult 
personal injury claims arising from allegations of historical childhood 
abuse. In generally considering issues that have featured significantly 
in the case law – which may be instructive in its own right – some 
attempt will be made, in passing or implicitly, to assess the 
argumentative coherence and persuasive force of particular judicial 
decisions. A few of the cases under discussion consider more than 
one of the recurrent issues: in other words, discussion of the 
recurrent issues overlaps in the cases under consideration. The cases 
to be identified in this article are, in each case, considered to be 
particularly illustrative of the recurrent issue under discussion. 
 
4.1 Recurrent Issues – “Silencing” Effect of Childhood Abuse 
 
 
The first recurrent issue for consideration focuses on the generally 
“silencing” or inhibiting effect of childhood abuse. In that context it 
has been recognised that adult survivors of abuse are frequently 
inhibited from pursuing timely civil law redress. This issue, as we  
have seen, is touched upon in a number of cases, and is given 
consideration in (for instance) law commission reports and other 
non-judicial contexts. There has been some divergence of judicial 
treatment under English law and Scots law of the specific question 
whether the so-called silencing or inhibiting effect of childhood abuse 
could be regarded as a precipitating factor in judicial decision-making 
in terms of whether to enforce, or not to enforce, applicable civil 
limitation laws in relevant circumstances – for instance, where there 
might exist a statutory discretion to disapply such laws. The question 
has been given consideration in a Scottish case (AS v Poor Sisters of 
Nazareth 2007 SC 688). Part of the judgment in that case turns on 
whether adult claimants, on account of the recognised inhibiting 
effect of childhood abuse on the pursuit of timely civil law redress, 
might  be  regarded  as  a  special  class  –  in  other  words,  a  class of 
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claimant worthy of special treatment when considering the 
application or disapplication of civil limitation laws in the context of a 
claim. A measure of judicial scepticism and resistance is expressed 
regarding the possibility that there might exist ‘a special class of 
abuse victims for whom it is to be taken as a matter of judicial 
knowledge that … [the abuse engenders] a “silencing effect”’.6 The 
particular context of this discussion is consideration of the extent of 
an individual’s awareness or unawareness of seriousness of injury 
(e.g. psychological injury) caused by historical childhood abuse such 
as would give him or her grounds, and the necessary stimulus, to 
initiate timely civil law proceedings.7 Judicial recognition of a special 
class of victim might have placed potential claimants in historical 
childhood abuse cases in a stronger position to argue that typically 
they (as a class) were, in terms of symptomology, unaware of the 
seriousness of injuries sustained by them in consequence of 
childhood abuse until, owing to the time-barring effect of civil 
limitation laws, it was too late to pursue a claim. 
 
The court rejected the idea of recognising a special class of victim, 
taking the view that, for a variety of reasons unique to the 
circumstances of the claimants in the case before the court, the 
claimants would not have been in a position to place themselves 
within such a class even if a class of that kind had already been 
judicially recognised. That view mainly turned on the fact that on a 
number of occasions in the past the claimants had spoken about the 
abuse and accordingly had not been absolutely silenced by the abuse. 
 
 
 
6 AS v Poor Sisters of Nazareth, at para. [35] (Lord President Hamilton, delivering the opinion 
of the court). A similarly sceptical position is outlined by Lady Smith in Colin Findleton v 
Quarriers [2006] CSOH 161, at para. [12]. 
7 As discussed more fully below, the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act  1973  allows 
for the running of limitation periods to be postponed to the date of the claimant’s (actual or 
imputed) awareness that injuries sustained by the claimant are sufficiently serious to justify 
the pursuit of civil law redress: see sections 17(2) and 17(3). 
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A further reason for rejecting the idea of a special class of victim is 
alluded to in the case, which is that there are inevitably differences 
between cases of this type, as one moves from case to case, and that 
any given case would always need to be considered on its merits and 
be informed, in appropriate cases and if required, by expert opinion 
uniquely adapted to the claimant’s circumstances.8 Accordingly,  
there could be no judicially recognised paradigm of the typical 
“institutional child abuse victim” constructed as a class of victim to 
which claimants in specific cases could be assigned and ipso facto be 
accorded advantageous treatment in terms of the application (or 
disapplication) of civil limitation laws. 
 
There are, of course, precedents in the law for the development of 
judicial paradigms ranging from the man on the Clapham omnibus at 
the broadest level of generality (see Hall v Brooklands Auto-Racing 
Club [1933] 1 KB 205, dicta of Greer LJ) to more specific paradigms 
such as those found in the clinical setting: for example, the standard 
of competence assigned to the ordinary skilled man or woman 
exercising, and professing to have, a relevant special skill, such as 
surgery (see Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 
1 WLR 582, at p. 586 (McNair J)). It seems remarkable that the factual 
uniqueness of cases should be seen as a reason not to attempt the 
construction of a judicial paradigm when it is clear that the practical 
operation of a paradigm in individual cases – involving, inevitably, 
factually unique circumstances – is a quite separate matter from 
identifying the assemblage of facts required to inform the 
construction of the paradigm in the first place. When AS v Poor 
Sisters of Nazareth was decided there was already sufficient evidence 
pointing to the long-term adverse effects of historical childhood 
abuse  –  and  recognised  patterning  of  post-abuse  symptoms  –  to 
 
8 See AS v Poor Sisters of Nazareth, at para. [35]: ‘There are differences between individual 
cases’. 
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inform the construction of an appropriate paradigm if there had been 
the will to attempt that. Such a paradigm might have been capable of 
use in section 19A discretion cases (see above); while its construction 
might have made the need, and the political will, for legislation in the 
form that subsequently emerged (namely, the Limitation (Childhood 
Abuse) (Scotland) Act 2017) less pressing. 
 
The highly limiting interpretation of the idea that childhood abuse  
has a “silencing effect” in AS v Poor Sisters of Nazareth – in the sense 
of making it, for all intents and purposes, a prerequisite that there 
had been an absolute silencing of the claimant – at a stroke narrows 
the scope, and oversimplifies the complexity, of the symptoms, signs 
and conditions that characteristically manifest as the sequelae of 
childhood abuse. Viewing the injury caused by abuse in those 
oversimplifying terms, it would always be possible to point to 
instances of “breaking the silence” that could be used to cast doubt 
upon the validity of a claim.9 Even a claimant’s taking preliminary 
medical or legal advice with a view to pursuing a civil action, and the 
pursuit of the action itself, could be viewed as precisely the “breaking 
of silence” that disqualifies the claimant from being treated as a 
“genuine” sufferer of historical childhood abuse. This suggests a 
vaguely absurd position: namely, that if the so-called “silencing 
effect” is perceived to be the dominant symptom  of childhood abuse 
– and requires to be absolute and unimpeached – how could anyone 
who is actively engaged in pursuing civil law redress, albeit late, ever 
be regarded as having been sufficiently “silenced” to be taken 
seriously as a claimant? 
 
 
 
9 Disqualifying “breaches of silence” mentioned in the case include situations  where 
childhood abuse claimants visited and spoke to the mother superior at the institution where 
historical abuse allegedly took place (i.e. Nazareth House, Cardonald, Glasgow); or sought 
religious counselling; or wrote to a GP and (in the letter) attributed ongoing mental health 
problems to childhood experiences at Nazareth House; or made disclosures to a national 
newspaper. See AS v Poor Sisters of Nazareth, at para. [34]. 
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In AS v Poor Sisters of Nazareth, the court recognises (especially at 
para. [22]), yet gives little weight to, the wider range of factors that 
could inform the development of a judicial paradigm of the typical 
institutional child abuse victim. These factors include the fact that the 
typical claimant would be likely to be inhibited (such as through 
under-confidence, feelings of shame and embarrassment or social 
isolation) from raising proceedings not only in early adulthood but 
“for many years thereafter”. A further factor, cited by counsel for the 
claimants but ultimately accorded little significance in the court’s 
deliberations, is that, typically, victims have painful memories and 
invariably put those memories to the back of their minds. Another 
inhibiting factor mentioned in the pleadings is that the  
socioeconomic background of the typical claimant may be such that 
recourse to lawyers, for example, for the purpose of initiating civil  
law proceedings, might be unusual and, by implication, daunting. This 
complex of factors – which, as we have seen, are well-recognised 
beyond the “four corners” of this case – is thus collapsed into a single 
overriding factor stripped of its many dimensions – i.e. “silencing 
effect”. Seen in those terms, it would always be a straightforward  
task for the court, if so minded, to dismiss the contention that a 
claimant has been (in the narrow sense) “silenced” in a given case. 
 
In cases arising under English law there has not been the same 
tendency as under Scots law to oversimplify recognised effects of 
childhood abuse: such as where judicial decision-making is tied to an 
unnecessarily narrow conception of the idea of being “silenced”. So a 
question such as “has this claimant literally been silenced by adverse 
childhood experiences?” probably would not be asked. Silence and 
the silencing effect of childhood abuse are, of course, standardly 
recognised in English case law as a problematic issue which – seen in 
the context of the wider range of inhibiting effects of childhood 
abuse, and mental health problems, to which recognition has been 
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given – have impacted upon the handling of relevant cases by the 
courts, sometimes to the advantage of claimants (in terms of 
successful litigation outcomes). And it may be that for that and other 
reasons it has not been thought necessary to attempt to construct a 
judicial paradigm of the (typical) childhood abuse victim. Thus, Sedley 
LJ in an unreported case (Ablett and others v Devon County Council, 
21 September 2000) when considering a civil law claim arising from 
allegations of sexual abuse at Forde Park Approved School in Newton 
Abbot, comments that: 
 
[i] nevitably there is a problem with limitation … . I say 
“inevitably” because it is in the nature of abuse of children by 
adults that it creates shame, fear and confusion and these in 
turn produce silence. Silence is known to be one of the most 
pernicious fruits of abuse. It means that allegations commonly 
surface, if they do, only many years after the abuse has 
ceased. 
 
Under English law there has been an altogether more  
accommodating judicial attitude towards the range of recognised 
effects of childhood abuse that inhibit potential claimants from 
pursuing timely civil law redress. In particular, the courts have not 
attempted to construct an artificially narrow and reductive 
conception of the “silencing” effect of abuse. The idea that instances 
of breaking of silence – for instance, characteristic of an adult’s 
seeking medical help or counselling – might result in a potential 
claimant’s being disqualified from pursuing relevant civil law 
proceedings is apparently alien to decision-making in the English 
courts. This seemingly more open-minded approach to the handling 
of relevant claims is quite well illustrated in Hoare where (for 
example) Baroness Hale looks beyond the position of the typical 
claimant to the typical behaviour of an alleged perpetrator of abuse, 
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describing him or her (at para. 60) as someone ‘whose deliberate and 
brutal actions towards a vulnerable person in his care may have 
resulted in immediate physical harm and much later serious 
psychiatric sequelae’. As she points out, authority figures who have 
perpetrated abuse have often exploited their position by acting in 
ways calculated to prevent abusive behaviour being reported. The 
suggestion is that victims’ silence and inaction in relation to the 
pursuit of civil law proceedings, is forced upon them by perpetrators 
of abuse; and this may, in itself, be viewed as an integral part of a 
course of abusive behaviour: 
 
[T]he perpetrators [of child sexual abuse] are so often people 
in authority over the victims, sometimes people whom the 
victims love and trust. These perpetrators have many ways, 
some subtle and some not so subtle, of making their victims 
keep quiet about what they have suffered. The abuse itself is 
the reason why so many victims do not come forward until 
years after the event. This presents a challenge to a legal 
system which resists stale claims. (Hoare, at para. 54) 
 
English law historical childhood abuse cases in which the section 33 
discretion has been invoked – the discretion allowing for the 3-year 
time bar to be disapplied where that is “equitable” (see above) – 
have come to represent a useful barometer of judicial attitudes,  
given that lately, in handling such cases, a relatively straightforward 
dichotomy has emerged between (respectively) cases applying, and 
cases disapplying, relevant civil limitation laws. In situations where 
the section 33 discretion has been successfully invoked by historical 
childhood abuse claimants the courts have tended to emphasise, 
rather  than  to  deny,  downplay  or  oversimplify,  the  recognised 
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inhibiting effects of childhood abuse mentioned above.10 (A common 
feature of these cases is a finding of no, or negligible, delay-induced 
defendant prejudice.) In contrast, in cases where the courts have 
declined to exercise the discretion, the approach has not been to 
minimise or underrate recognised effects of childhood abuse given 
that that might subvert relevant civil law claims where precisely  
those effects are found to be a predisposing factor in judicial 
decision-making. Rather, the approach has been to emphasise 
seriousness of defendant prejudice and potential unfairness of the 
trial process as predisposing factors – in other words, prejudice, or 
potential prejudice, arising from the claimant’s delay (which may 
occasionally be exceptionally lengthy delay) in initiating proceedings 
and the related possibility of evidence being lost or becoming 
unavailable, or key witnesses dying (and so on).11 
 
10 For example, in CD v Catholic Child Welfare Society (Diocese of Middlesbrough) [2016] 
EWHC 3335 (QB), the claimant made allegations of historical physical and sexual abuse 
(including rape) against members of staff at a reformatory school. There was a seven-year 
delay in bringing the claim. The court’s assessment of the reliability of the claimant as a 
witness turned on what was taken to be an accepted fact that a ‘rape allegation was unlikely 
to be affected by the passage of time in terms of cogency. It was not something that [a 
victim] … should have forgotten’. In addition, the court found that the claimant ‘…had been 
too embarrassed and ashamed to report the abuse and that he had wished to put his 
experiences to the back of his mind’. (See HHJ Gosnell, at para. (2).) The section  33  
discretion was successfully invoked in that case. In A v The Trustees of the Watchtower Bible 
and Tract Society and Others [2015] EWHC 1722 (QB) there was recognition that a claimant 
‘might have been disabled from commencing proceedings by any psychiatric injury that 
might have been suffered’. An expert report had conceded (and the court accepted) that 
post traumatic stress disorder suffered by the claimant justifiably explained why the  
claimant was ‘unable to focus upon the prospect of commencing [timely] proceedings …’. 
(Globe J, at para. 53) See also dicta of Males J in NA v Nottinghamshire County Council [2014] 
EWHC 4005 (QB) (at para. 82): ‘The troubled background of many claimants complaining of 
child abuse must be taken into account. … The law must also recognise the inhibitions which 
abuse will often cause, making it difficult or impossible for claimants to describe what has 
happened to them, sometimes until well after they reach adulthood. Such considerations 
may provide a good reason for delay in commencing proceedings.’ (Note that in this case the 
section 33 discretion was successfully invoked even though the substantive claim was 
ultimately rejected as the claimant failed in her attempt to assign vicarious liability to a local 
authority.) 
11 It should be noted that section 33(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980 specifically requires any 
exercise of judicial discretion disapplying the 3-year time bar to take account of the extent to 
which such an exercise would prejudice the defendant; while section 33(1)(a) requires the 
court to have similar regard to the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff. Relevant case law 
normally emphasises the impact, on a party defending a claim, of the possibility of evidence 
deteriorating over time. This is more often than not expressed as the judicial imperative to 
“resist stale claims”. As we have seen, a leading case supportive of the rationales justifying 
civil limitation laws is the Australian Brisbane case. See, in particular, pp. 551–553 (McHugh 
J). Cases that do not expressly cite Brisbane but nonetheless give credence to the judicial 
imperative  to  resist  stale  claims  as  a  justification  for  civil  limitation  laws  include Hoare 
24  
 
In the final analysis, the complex of factors and symptoms inhibiting 
the pursuit of civil litigation in childhood abuse cases is perhaps more 
“paralysing” than it is “silencing”: implying that an unduly narrow and 
literal focus on the “silencing” effect of childhood abuse in judicial 
decision-making (as seen in relevant Scots law cases) can only  be 
seen as inappropriately reductive and distorting. In only one reported 
case under Scots law has the court exercised the section 19A 
discretion in favour of a historical childhood abuse claimant (EA (AP)  
v GN (AP) [2013] CSOH 161).12 By contrast, under English law, there 
appears to have been a more balanced distribution of successful, as 
against unsuccessful, instances of the corresponding English law 
section 33 discretion being invoked in the context of relevant civil law 
claims. 
 
4.2 Recurrent Issues – Claimants’ Awareness of (Seriousness of) 
Injury 
 
The second recurrent issue for discussion touches upon the practical 
and  legal difficulties that  adult  claimants in  childhood  abuse  cases 
 
(especially Baroness Hale at para. 54). See also Yew Bon Tew v Kenderaan Bas Maria [1983] 1 
AC 553, at p. 563 (Lord Brightman); and Dobbie v Medway [1994] 1 WLR 1234, at p. 1238 (Sir 
Thomas Bingham MR). In RE v GE [2015] EWCA Civ 287 part of the delay in bringing a claim 
was due to unexplained inaction on the part of the claimant in pursuing the claim. 
(Straightforward tardiness is implied in the judgment.) In Ms Michelle Wilde v Coventry City 
Council 2017 WL 01946928 there was a 29-year delay and an almost complete absence of 
documentary evidence relating to the time the claimant spent in Newfield House, Coventry, 
where she was allegedly raped and sexually abused. As a result, a fair trial was considered 
impossible. A complicating factor was that the claimant gave an inadequate explanation for 
delaying commencing proceedings or seeking legal advice so as to make it (in the opinion of 
the court) equitable to exclude the time limit after a period as lengthy as 29 years. 
12 Lord Kinclaven exercised the section 19A discretion to override limitation laws in favour of 
an adult survivor of childhood abuse, resulting in an award against the claimant’s uncle who 
had sexually abused the claimant in childhood. The decision appears to have turned on the 
fact that the claim lay directly against an individual rather than against an institution or 
organisation, such as a church or local authority; the implication being that reliance on the 
section 19A discretion would more readily be successfully upheld in the former case than the 
latter. This seems remiss given the well-documented capabilities of institutions and 
organisations to utilise all the (often considerable) resources at their disposal to defeat 
claims relating to, or to hamper investigations into, historical childhood abuse allegations. In 
this regard for instance, the UN (among others) has been highly critical of the Catholic  
Church (see UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2014). 
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have encountered in situations where civil limitation laws typically 
provide that an applicable limitation period is to run from the time 
when the person wronged actually became – or was deemed by the 
court to have become – aware of the injury suffered. Under English 
law, date of knowledge is governed by section 14 of the Limitation 
Act 1980. Under Scots law, date of knowledge (or of “awareness”) – 
extending to awareness of both the intrinsic seriousness of the injury 
suffered and the fact that the injury was sufficiently serious to justify 
pursuing civil law redress – is governed by section 17(2)(b) of the 
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. Statutory provisions 
framed in this way are intended to mitigate the perceived severity of 
civil limitation laws that might otherwise operate against a claimant 
who may, for some time, be unaware that he or she has sustained a 
particular injury, or is at any rate unaware of its significance or 
seriousness or its connection to historical events in the claimant’s  
life. The running of the applicable limitation period is typically 
postponed to (in effect) the date of the claimant’s knowledge or 
awareness of statutorily defined facts relevant to the injury 
complained of. So, for instance, a limitation period may in a given 
case only begin to run from the date when the claimant first became 
aware that a significant injury had been caused to him or her. And, in 
appropriate cases, this may be many years after a 3-year limitation 
period has run its course. In considering this recurrent issue, the 
emphasis will be on Scots law. 
 
A case already mentioned which provides a convenient focus for 
discussion of this recurrent issue is CG v Glasgow City Council.13 In  
that case consideration was given to the claim of a former resident of 
a   children's   home   operated   by   Glasgow   City   Council:  Kerelaw 
 
13 The case is first reported following a preliminary procedural debate before Lord Malcolm 
in the Outer House of the Court of Session ([2009] CSOH 34) and is followed by a report of a 
later procedural hearing before an Extra Division of the Inner House comprising Lord Eassie, 
Lord Bannatyne and Lord Wheatley (2011 SC 1). 
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Residential School in Stevenston, Ayrshire. (See, for background 
information, the report commissioned jointly by the Scottish 
Government and Glasgow City Council enquiring into abuses 
committed at this facility (The Scottish Government, 2009).) 
 
The claimant in the case sought civil law redress in respect of “brutal 
physical treatment and sexual abuse” (CG v Glasgow City  Council 
2011 SC 1, at para. [5]) to which she had been subjected by staff 
employed at the residential school. The abuse took place over a 3- 
year period between 1992 and 1995, beginning when the claimant 
was 13 years of age. By statute the claimant would have had to raise 
the action before her nineteenth birthday (29 June 1997) – in other 
words, when she was still 18, having (by any reckoning) barely 
entered adulthood14 – in order to avoid the action being time- 
barred.15 This is because Scots law allows for periods of “nonage” 
(broadly, minority) to be disregarded in calculating the running of the 
limitation period. On that basis, the 3-year limitation period only 
starts to run when a potential claimant reaches an age at which he or 
she enjoys full legal capacity: under Scots law at the time the age in 
question was 16. The entire period from birth to sixteen (the period 
of so-called “nonage”) is thus to be disregarded for this purpose. (But 
note that, in this case, it was legally competent for the limitation 
period to be further extended so as to run from an even later date – 
namely, the date of the claimant’s awareness of seriousness of the 
injuries complained of.) 
 
 
 
14 Being designated an adult by law is by no means an indication of maturity. The definition 
of “child” for purposes of Art. 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (United Nations, 
Treaty Series, Vol. 1577, p. 3) is a human being below the age of 18. Thus 18 is a standard 
reference point for purposes of the rights conferred by the Convention and other 
international legal instruments. In Art 1. of the Convention allowance is made for the 
possibility of individual states parties to the Convention legally establishing different 
thresholds between childhood and adulthood. 
15 This position arises from the operation of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 
1973, section 17(2) and (3), construed with the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 1991, 
section 1(2). 
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The action was not in fact raised by the claimant until 2007, around a 
decade after the expiry of the limitation period established under the 
applicable statutory regime (which had already allowed for a 
disregard of a period of “nonage”, as mentioned above). It was 
therefore necessary for the claimant to seek to rely, among other 
things, on statutory provisions allowing for the further postponement 
of the running of the limitation period – i.e. not only during her 
“nonage” but during a supervening period when – the claimant 
contended – she had lacked the necessary awareness of the fact that 
the injuries she sustained in childhood were sufficiently significant 
and serious to justify initiating civil law proceedings. 
 
Ultimately the court took the view that the statutory time-bar should 
operate against the claimant. Lord Eassie – delivering the opinion of 
the court – observed that the court was unable to see any basis upon 
which the claim could ‘properly and objectively be judged of 
insufficient worth to warrant [civil] proceedings’: 
 
In our view, it cannot be said that the catalogue of physical 
and serious sexual abuse of which the pursuer now complains 
would not have furnished, on her leaving the school, a claim  
of damages of sufficient magnitude to make worthwhile the 
raising of proceedings … . In other words, it cannot be said 
that the damages which would be awarded to the pursuer in 
respect of that abuse would be so small as not to justify the 
taking of steps by way of litigation. (CG v Glasgow City Council 
2011 SC 1, at para. [31], emphasis added) 
 
Leaving aside for the moment the question of the “objectivity” of a 
claimant’s awareness (discussed under the third recurrent issue, 
below), what is remarkable about this key passage is that there is at 
least   an   implicit   judicial   expectation   that   on   leaving   Kerelaw 
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Residential School the claimant not only should have recognised the 
scale of the wrongdoing committed against her and viewed it as a 
civil wrong but should have taken steps to initiate civil law 
proceedings in response. The case report notes that the claimant was 
born in June 1978 and that she left the school sometime in 1995, 
suggesting that, at the relevant time, she was aged either 16 or 17. 
There thus appears to be an expectation that the claimant at the age 
of 16 or 17 – presumably extending generally to claimants of that age 
in the same circumstances – would typically recognise the potential 
for the abuses committed against them to found a claim under the 
civil law. In other words, persons of that age and (im)maturity would 
be expected to have the necessary forensic insight – or knowledge of 
the workings of the civil justice system – to make a connection 
between abuse suffered in childhood and the availability of civil law 
redress. 
 
If the relevant judicial expectations centred upon assumptions made 
about a mid-teenager’s perception of the criminality of relevant 
abusive behaviour, then they would not seem especially unrealistic. 
Indeed, the case report mentions that the claimant had little  
difficulty viewing the abuses in terms of criminal wrongdoing (CG v 
Glasgow City Council 2011 SC 1, at para. [5]: ‘[The claimant] … 
regarded the physical assaults as a matter for the police rather than 
civil lawyers …’). But the key judicial expectations appear to go 
further than even assumptions of the criminal and civil law 
dimensions of abusive behaviour. There appears to be an expectation 
that the claimant in her mid-teens was expected to have the strength 
of purpose and financial resources (even disregarding limitations 
there may be on the availability of legal aid) actually to follow  
through with a claim under the civil law. Taking such a decisive step 
suggests a level of engagement with law and legal processes that 
would probably be beyond the capability of the average teenager, to 
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say nothing of teenagers who have endured (and have only just 
emerged from) years of abuse. 
 
It should furthermore be questioned whether a potential claimant 
would have the foresight to predict that initially transient physically 
abusive behaviour (to which the court appears to be referring in the 
above passage) could potentially lead to persistent and ineradicable 
psychological injury in later life, as frequently happens in childhood 
abuse cases. As we have seen, this type of injury, resulting from 
childhood abuse, has been given judicial recognition in the Supreme 
Court by Baroness Hale when she refers to “serious psychiatric 
sequelae” (Hoare, at para. 60). There is a resonance in CG v Glasgow 
City Council of Lord Griffiths’s observation in the Stubbings case that 
he had the greatest difficulty in accepting that a woman who knows 
that she has been raped does not know that she has suffered a 
significant injury (Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498 HL(E), at p. 506). 
Of course, the extent of the injury sustained is an issue in that a rape 
victim – though undoubtedly aware of the significance of the 
immediate physical violation – cannot possibly know anything of 
possible psychological injury that may (or may not) emerge in the 
months and years following the assault. Likewise, if Lord Griffiths’s 
viewpoint is transposed to childhood rape or other serious abuse, in 
circumstances where the claimant has a restricted timescale within 
which to pursue civil law redress, an allegation of significant  
(physical) injury upon which timely civil law redress is actually 
pursued (i.e. without falling foul of civil limitation laws) cannot 
possibly take account of psychological injury which may (or may not) 
emerge at some unknown future time. Indeed, the later-emerging 
psychological injury may prove more significant, lasting and 
incapacitating than the physical injury that preceded it. As a purely 
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practical proposition, how does one make “tomorrow’s injuries” 
(which have not yet emerged) the subject of “today’s claim”?16 
 
There is also the difficulty which potential claimants encounter of 
recognising a causal connection between emerging or ongoing 
psychological injury and historical abuse. As we have seen, relevant 
clinical literature establishes that adult survivors may often be 
unaware that there is necessarily any link between psychological 
problems experienced during adulthood and physical or sexual abuse 
suffered in childhood (Lindberg and Distad, 1985, pp. 332–333).17 In a 
Scottish case which centred on allegations of historical institutional 
childhood abuse (M v O’Neill, 2006 SLT 823, at para. [92]), Lord 
Glennie commented that: 
 
… it would be highly material if the [claimant] … could show 
that her failure to bring the action in time was caused by the 
abuse, in the sense that the abuse resulted in, or contributed 
to, her reluctance to come forward. 
 
On the face of it, this observation appears perceptive in terms of 
resonating with observations made in relevant literature concerning 
the psychological sequelae of childhood abuse. However, in the same 
opinion, Lord Glennie comments that the claimant in the case failed 
to  convince  the  court  that  the  childhood  abuse  she  had suffered 
 
16 The position of the claimant is evidently less intractable in situations where a (timely) 
claim is defended by an insurance company or a public authority or a public corporation. 
Under the Administration of Justice Act 1982, section 12, the court can make a provisional 
award of damages to a person who has sustained injury as a result of the fault of another 
person in circumstances where there is a risk that at some time in the future the injured 
person will, as a result of the injury, suffer some serious deterioration in his or her physical 
or mental condition. 
17 Essentially the same point has been made in non-clinical (i.e. specifically legal) literature 
(see Mathews, 2003, p. 232): ‘As demonstrated, in most cases the plaintiff will neither know 
of, nor be reasonably able to know of, their rights until well after the expiry of the limitation 
period, if at all. The acts, the situation and the coping strategies adopted mean that survivors 
often will not know of the nature and the extent of the psychological injury experienced, or 
of the causal link between the acts perpetrated and those problems; and they will avoid 
ascertainment of these facts until they are psychologically able to do so’. 
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caused the delay in pursuing civil law redress that activated the 
statutory time-bar because, in the course of seeking help for her 
psychological problems, she ‘did not tell the relevant professionals 
anything about what she thought was the real cause, namely the 
abuse’ (2006 SLT 823, at paras. [76] and [92]). This appears to point 
to a surprising judicial assumption that adult victims of childhood 
abuse are ordinarily in a position to self-diagnose; the implication 
being that the onus is on victims to apprise therapists or psychiatrists 
of experiences in their past life which might have contributed to 
present-day dysfunctionality. More specifically, it implies – contrary 
to what is suggested in the literature – that relevant claimants, 
without necessarily having the benefit of professional intervention, 
are instilled with an awareness of the origins in childhood abuse of 
psychological injury experienced in adulthood. 
 
Thus in O’Neill the claimant appears to have been expected to 
identify and inform medical professionals of, a causal connection 
between childhood historical abuse and psychological injury suffered 
in adulthood. She would then, in Lord Glennie’s words, have 
successfully demonstrated ‘that her failure to bring the action in time 
was caused by the abuse, in the sense that the abuse resulted in, or 
contributed to, her reluctance to come forward’. But, assuming she 
had had the requisite awareness, would she have secured any legal 
advantage by informing medical professionals of that? Had she in fact 
so informed them, the court might have treated her awareness as a 
reason for disqualifying her from relying on provisions of civil 
limitation laws postponing the operation of the statutory time-bar 
during periods in which there is a claimed lack of awareness of any 
connection between psychological injury experienced in adulthood 
and earlier childhood abuse. Moreover – recalling discussion of the 
first recurrent issue (above) – would the claimant have been  
regarded  by the  court  as  having broken  her  silence  in  a  way that 
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disqualified her from being treated as a “genuine” sufferer of 
historical childhood abuse? It would seem that, judicially, the  
claimant in O’Neill was “damned if she did” (so inform the medical 
professionals) and “damned if she didn’t”. 
 
We have seen that, in the context of civil  law redress under  Scots 
law, the judicial expectations and assumptions considered under this 
(second) recurrent issue have created intractable difficulties for 
claimants in situations where the courts have had the task of  
deciding whether the running of an applicable limitation period is to 
be suspended by reason of the claimants’ unawareness that injury 
caused by abuse suffered in childhood was sufficiently serious to 
justify pursuing civil law redress. On further examination of the case 
law it becomes clear that yet another layer of difficulty has been 
added to the legal position of such claimants where the courts, in 
terms of the applicable statutory provisions, have had to decide upon 
a claimant’s awareness of relevant facts (including the fact that an 
injury may be considered sufficiently serious to justify civil law 
proceedings). The further question for consideration in this context is 
whether the court’s determination is to be on the basis of the 
claimant’s actual awareness or on the basis of an “objective” judicial 
attribution of awareness which either disregards, or only partly takes 
account of, the claimant’s actual awareness. This is the third 
recurrent issue flagged for discussion, and there is  relevant  Scots 
case law and English case law – the latter demonstrating  a 
contrasting judicial position – that it is useful to review in this 
connection. 
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4.3 Recurrent Issues – “Objectivity” of Claimants’ Awareness of 
(Seriousness of) Injury 
 
Both the single-judge decision and the three-judge decision in CG v 
Glasgow City Council (the latter of which overrules important aspects 
of the former)18 concern issues of principle which also arose for 
consideration in the House of Lords decision in Hoare under 
comparable English law civil limitation legislation. One key issue – 
where, at the level of the specific statutory provisions there are 
important similarities and differences in Scots law and English law – is 
that of whether a claimant’s awareness of facts, which include the 
fact that an injury was significant enough to justify initiating civil law 
proceedings, is subjective in terms of the claimant’s actual awareness 
or objective in the sense that awareness is judicially ascribed or 
imputed to the claimant, or indeed both – i.e. partly subjective and 
partly objective.19 
 
The core issue is that it may not even occur to a potential claimant to 
pursue a civil law claim if, at a given time, he or she is unaware, or 
unable to become aware, of significant information that could 
establish a basis for a claim, such as the presence, or perceived 
seriousness, of an injury, illness or medical condition causally 
connected to a prior injury or event where, in the present context, 
the prior injury or event involves the abuse of the claimant when he 
 
 
18 See above, n. 13. 
19 The objectivity–subjectivity “debate” arises in the context of comparable statutory 
provisions in other jurisdictions, although the precise framing and emphasis of issues arising 
for consideration differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In Queensland, Australia, for 
instance, provisions of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) allow for extensions of the 
time within which personal injury cases may be brought to court without being time-barred. 
(See especially section 31(2) construed with sections 30(1)(b)(i) and 30(1)(c)(ii).) The 
legislation calls for prospective claimants in personal injury cases to take reasonable steps to 
discover material facts that could be of relevance to their knowledge or awareness  of 
injuries that they have sustained. This extends to obtaining appropriate advice. Claimants  
are also expected to assess the prospects of success of relevant civil proceedings in terms of 
whether any future award of damages might be sufficient to justify raising the action in the 
first place. The assessment is based on the hypothesised perception of a reasonable person. 
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or she was a child. Scots law and English law both recognise the need 
to postpone the running of limitation periods to the date of the 
claimant’s (actual or imputed) awareness that civil law redress might 
be pursued in respect of the injuries sustained. (For this purpose, 
elements of the (Scots law) Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 
1973, section 17(2)(b) are comparable to the (English law) Limitation 
Act 1980, section 14.) 
 
In the particular context of the Scots law statutory provisions under 
discussion in CG v Glasgow City Council a key decision in the case 
turned on the interpretation of section 17(2)(b) of the Prescription 
and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 which allows for the 
postponement of the running of the applicable limitation period in 
defined circumstances (but centring on claimant “awareness”). 
Section 17(2)(b) provides that no personal injury action may be 
brought unless it is commenced within a period of three years after 
the date on which the claimant became, or on which, in the opinion 
of the court, it would have been reasonably practicable for the 
claimant to become, aware of certain facts. 
 
The first of these “statutory facts” is that the injuries were sufficiently 
serious to justify bringing an action of damages, and for this purpose 
it is to be assumed that the person defending the (hypothetical) 
action has admitted liability and that he or she is capable of meeting 
an award of damages made by the court. (See 1973 Act, section 
17(2)(b)(i).) The two further “statutory facts” are, first, that the 
injuries were attributable in whole or in part to an act or omission 
and, secondly, that the defender was a person to whose act or 
omission the injuries were attributable in whole or in part (or the 
employer or principal of such a person). (See, for this purpose, 1973 
Act, section 17(2)(b)(ii) and (iii).) Section 22(3) of the Act additionally 
requires that knowledge that any act or omission was or was not, as a 
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matter of law, actionable, is to be treated as irrelevant. The rationale 
behind sections 17(2)(b) and 22(3) is the establishment of a 
framework within which the court can assess a particular claimant’s 
state of awareness, in a context in which the “limitation clock” does 
not run during claimant unawareness but does run during claimant 
awareness. 
 
Difficult as these statutory provisions are, in summary the legislation 
requires consideration to be given to whether a potential claimant 
was aware – or whether it would have been reasonably practicable 
for a claimant to be aware – that injuries sustained are serious 
enough to justify a hypothetical damages action: (A) which has not 
been contested, (B) where the defender is financially capable of 
meeting any award of damages made by the court, and (C) where 
there are no legal barriers to a successful outcome for the pursuer, 
such as a lack of “actionability” – for example, by reason of the 
operation of civil limitation laws.20 In addition a judgment is to be 
made as to whether a potential claimant was aware – or whether it 
would have been reasonably practicable for a claimant to be aware – 
that a causal connection could be made between the injuries 
complained of in the instant action and: (A) historical acts or 
omissions experienced by the claimant that are (B) specifically 
attributable to a person who is either the defender in the instant 
action or the employer or principal of such person (where, for 
example, vicarious liability is envisaged). 
 
 
20 The first “statutory fact”, combined with the section 22(3) disregard, appear to be aimed  
at creating a hypothesis of the “ideal” action of damages (from the standpoint of the 
claimant) where anything that could impede a successful outcome for the claimant is to be 
imagined away. This allows the focus of this “statutory fact” to be on whether the injury per 
se is sufficiently serious to found the imaginary “ideal” action of damages where factors may 
be disregarded that might in the “real world” make the action not worth pursuing in terms  
of causing the claimant to believe that the likely “value” of the action is diminished by such 
factors – e.g. costs and risks of pursuing a contested action and the risk of a defender’s 
proving to be impecunious or insolvent. It therefore helps to establish an imaginary 
minimum threshold for pursuit of a claim below which a claim could be seen as (financially, 
at least) pointless. 
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Taking a step back for the moment, it is in fact possible to focus on 
key aspects of the judicial decision-making around the detail of these 
(complex) provisions which appear to point quite revealingly to 
underlying judicial attitudes even if, at best, we may be able to find 
nothing more overt than an apparent judicial lack of sympathy with 
the position that claimants have found themselves to be in (whether 
as claimants in the here and now, or as historical sufferers of abuse in 
childhood). Significantly, what is striking about section 17(2)(b) is that 
the question of the date of a claimant’s awareness of the “statutory 
facts” is clearly framed in the legislation as a choice between, on one 
hand, the claimant’s actual awareness and, on the other, awareness 
determined by the court having regard to what is reasonably 
practicable: 
 
… the date … on which the pursuer in the action became, or 
on which, in the opinion of the court, it would have been 
reasonably practicable for him in all the circumstances to 
become, aware … . (1973 Act, preamble to section 17(2)(b); 
emphasis added) 
 
On an entirely natural reading of the legislation the date of  
awareness is either the date ‘on which the pursuer … became aware’ 
or the date ‘on which, in the opinion of the court, it would have been 
reasonably practicable for … [the pursuer] in all the circumstances to 
become, aware’ of the so-called “statutory facts”. Thus on the face of 
it a choice is to be made between court-determined actual  
awareness and court-attributed deemed awareness with apparently 
nothing in the legislation to guide or inform that choice. It is not clear 
why, if the provision is properly disjunctive, the court would need to 
make a choice that commits it definitively to one or other of these 
alternatives. It would seem sensible, for instance, for a determination 
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to be made as to what it may have been reasonably practicable for a 
pursuer to become aware of if for any reason actual awareness could 
not be determined: for example, if the court had difficulty  
establishing key facts. Alternatively, in providing for some 
consideration of what it may be reasonably practicable for a claimant 
to be aware of, the legislation appears to allow for the possibility that 
a particular claimant in a given case may for some reason be unable 
to develop an awareness of matters that for other claimants might be 
conspicuously obvious – hence the need for some degree of 
objectivity. 
 
Unaccountably, the courts in Scotland have adopted an extremely 
narrow approach to the interpretation of the provisions in question  
in the context of historical childhood abuse claims. It is clear from 
cases such as the three-judge decision in CG v Glasgow City Council 
that the judicial approach to the alternatives under discussion has 
little, if anything, to do with the need to address evidentiary lacunae 
or similar difficulties. In fact, the wider case law confirms that the 
weight of judicial opinion has been towards the assertion of a blanket 
objective test – in the sense of a purely court-ascribed test – of 
awareness, with almost nothing of the subjective awareness of the 
claimant being thought to be of any relevance (contrary to what is 
suggested by the applicable statutory provisions). Thus the question 
whether awareness is subjective or objective or a combination of 
both, was made clear under Scots law when the single-judge decision 
in CG v Glasgow City Council was overruled by the subsequent three- 
judge decision. Lord Eassie, delivering the opinion of the court, refers 
to an earlier case that had settled the matter,21 and in taking the   
view that a purely objective test of awareness was to be applied held 
 
 
 
21 Lord Eassie’s reference is to AS v Poor Sisters of Nazareth 2007 SC 688. 
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Lord Malcolm’s position (in the single-judge decision in the Outer 
House) to be in error.22 
 
These, and reference to other averments in a similar vein, 
indicate the Lord Ordinary’s [Lord Malcolm’s] view that the 
test whether injuries were sufficiently serious was to be 
viewed subjectively through the eyes of the pursuer. … 
 
In our view, what was necessary was to consider the nature 
and consequences of the wrongs averred by the pursuer to 
have been inflicted upon her and taking the averments 
respecting those matters pro veritate to decide whether, 
viewed objectively, they would have warranted taking 
proceedings on the statutory assumptions of admitted liability 
and guaranteed solvency of the defender. (CG v Glasgow City 
Council 2011 SC 1, at paras. [17] and [21]) 
 
Moreover, if there was to be any scope for taking account of 
subjective considerations it was to be restricted to mere “individual 
personal features” that entered into the assessment of quantum. In 
that context, Lord Eassie approved the position adopted in the 
Carnegie case (Carnegie v Lord Advocate 2001 SC 802) where Lord 
Johnston (at para. [16]) expressed the view that, in assessing 
quantum, ‘injury to a finger may be of much greater consequence to  
a concert pianist than to someone whose work and hobbies do not 
involve fine finger movements’ (see Lord Eassie, CG v Glasgow City 
Council 2011 SC 1, at para. [26]). Ironically, whilst the English law 
 
22 Initially the court rejects the idea that awareness of the “statutory facts” is a matter to be 
viewed from the (subjective) viewpoint of the claimant: ‘Again, put shortly,  the  Lord 
Ordinary [Lord Malcolm] appears to come to the conclusion that the Scottish legislation 
admits of a subjective view of the seriousness of the injury test. … These, and reference to 
other averments in a similar vein, indicate the Lord Ordinary’s view that the test whether 
injuries were sufficiently serious was to be viewed subjectively through the eyes of the 
pursuer’. See Lord Eassie, CG v Glasgow City Council 2011 SC 1, at paras. [11] and [17], 
referring to the opinion of Lord Malcolm in CG v Glasgow City Council [2009] CSOH 34. 
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statutory provisions point more definitively to an objective judicial 
determination of a claimant’s knowledge or awareness than the 
comparable Scots law provisions,23 Lord Hoffmann in Hoare 
nonetheless accepts the need to have regard – to a not insignificant 
degree – to the actual knowledge of the claimant. Thus: 
 
[The] test itself is an entirely impersonal standard: not 
whether the claimant himself would have considered the 
injury sufficiently serious to justify proceedings but whether 
he would “reasonably” have done so. You ask what the 
claimant knew about the injury he had suffered, you add any 
knowledge about the injury which may be imputed to him 
under section 14(3) and you then ask whether a reasonable 
person with that knowledge would have considered the injury 
sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for 
damages against a defendant who did not dispute liability and 
was able to satisfy a judgment. ([2008] 1 AC 844, at para. [34]) 
 
The case law in Scotland seems to point to an approach that has been 
resolutely uninterested in asking – to use Lord Hoffmann’s words – 
‘what the claimant knew about the injury he had suffered’. It is 
furthermore and in any event difficult to see how the relevant case 
law can be reconciled with the clear terms of the applicable statutory 
provisions (viz. 1973 Act, preamble to section 17(2)(b)). As we have 
seen, the legislation looks to the identification of the date on which 
the pursuer (actually) became aware of the “statutory facts” or, 
failing that for any (unspecified) reason, identification of the date on 
which, in the opinion of the court, it would have been reasonably 
 
23 The English law provisions – unlike the Scots law provisions – are not framed as a choice 
between court-determined actual knowledge and court-attributed deemed knowledge – see 
the Limitation Act 1980, section 14(2): ‘For the purposes of this section an injury is  
significant if the person whose date of knowledge is in question would reasonably have 
considered it sufficiently serious to justify his instituting proceedings for damages against a 
defendant who did not dispute liability and was able to satisfy a judgment’. 
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practicable for the pursuer in all the circumstances to become aware 
of the “statutory facts”. The three-judge decision in CG v Glasgow 
City Council appears to have collapsed these alternatives into a single 
exercise which, crucially, erases virtually anything that could count as 
an indication of the pursuer’s actual awareness. 
 
Even the part of section 17(2)(b) – the “objective” part – that calls 
upon the court to identify the date on which ‘in the opinion of the 
court, it would have been reasonably practicable for … [the pursuer] 
in all the circumstances to become, aware’ of the “statutory facts” 
arguably does not necessitate so drastic an erasure of subjective 
factors attending a claimant’s awareness. In asking the court to 
consider when it would have been reasonably practicable for the 
pursuer in all the circumstances to have become aware of the 
“statutory facts” the legislation appears to require, not to inhibit, 
interrogation of factors relevant to the claimant’s awareness  that 
may be unique to the circumstances of the claimant (and are thus not 
insubstantially “subjective”). What the court appears to be asked, in 
other words, is the question when would the practical realities of a 
claimant’s situation – taking into account all of his or her unique 
circumstances – have made it more or less reasonable for that 
particular claimant in that situation to have become aware of the 
“statutory facts”? 
 
There is a key difficulty with an objective or imputed judicial 
assessment of awareness that for all practical purposes renders 
irrelevant any element of the actual awareness of the claimant. It is 
that the further one moves from a claimant’s actual awareness to an 
objective, judicially determined, awareness the greater the risk that 
the decision will fail to reflect anything of the reality of a claimant’s 
(historical) situation and will simply represent what a judge thinks 
that  that  reality  ought  to  be.  Such  an  approach  also  creates  a 
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palpable caesura between judicial consciousness and claimant 
consciousness, making it entirely reasonable for a claimant to ask 
whether key particulars of his or her lived experiences count for 
anything at all or are simply to be “airbrushed” away. The danger 
there, of course, is that important rights may, in the result, suffer the 
same fate. On the narrower question of judicial attitudes, H. L.  A. 
Hart has observed: 
 
Judges talk much of the judgments of the “ordinary 
reasonable man” and claim to be able to discover what he 
thinks. But the method used is usually introspection and this  
is because the judgment of the reasonable man very often is a 
mere projected shadow, cast by the judge’s own moral views 
or those of his own social class. (Hart, 1968, p. 171) 
 
5 Concluding Reflections 
 
 
This article has sought to take stock of a few key aspects of legal and 
judicial policy in the application of civil limitation laws in the area of 
adult personal injury claims arising from allegations of historical 
childhood abuse. This has uncovered not only differences in principle 
in judicial approaches to such claims as between English law and  
Scots law – partly accountable to legislative differences – but 
apparent divergences in judicial attitudes towards adult  claimants 
and towards the child or adolescent sufferers of abuse themselves. It 
thus seems appropriate, in our concluding reflections, to revisit two 
particularly resonant issues that have emerged from the preceding 
discussion. The first centres on identifying what could be described as 
the “true nature” of relevant claims and the “true identity” of 
claimants. This was touched upon briefly at the outset. The second 
issue – focusing on the contrasting attitudes that have emerged 
within recent English law and Scots law judicial decision-making – 
42  
necessitates a few brief and final remarks on what may be inferred 
from relevant case reports. 
 
5.1 Nature of Claims and Identity of Claimants 
 
In their approach to adult civil law claims arising from allegations of 
historical child abuse – where claims are more often than not treated 
as live “adult claims” rather than postponed “child claims” – the 
Scottish courts in particular have tended to engage with claimants in 
a way that has given little recognition to the underlying nature of the 
claims and the identity and position of claimants. Given  that 
claimants actually were adults in the cases in question it is perhaps 
unsurprising that they were treated as such by the courts. However, 
we have seen evidence of what might be described as “attributes of 
adulthood” – for example, implying maturity, experience of the 
world, conversance with legal and judicial processes, and so on – 
being assigned to claimants at times when they had scarcely entered 
adulthood, implying the construction of a false boundary between 
childhood and adulthood, at least so far as the presumed 
psychological makeup of relevant individuals (or individuals of that 
class) is concerned. This has been manifested in, among other things, 
unrealistic judicial expectations of the steps that a young adult might 
be expected to take in order to secure timely civil law redress in 
appropriate circumstances. (See, especially, CG v Glasgow City  
Council 2011 SC 1, as discussed in section 4.2 above.) Yet the key 
difficulty with the pursuit of civil law redress is in truth even more 
acute than suggested in relevant judicial opinions because, as we 
have seen, young adults are rarely in a position to take the steps 
necessary to secure such redress precisely because decisive action of 
that kind is typically inhibited for as long as so-called latency periods 
run  their  course.  For  a  range  of  reasons,  considered  in  section 3 
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above and elsewhere, decisive action may be postponed for many 
years into adulthood. 
 
The idea that civil law historical abuse claims may best be seen, at a 
more fundamental level, as postponed “child claims” – namely,  
claims that centre on historical violations of the emotional, physical, 
psychological or sexual integrity of the child – may cause us to 
consider carefully, or to reconsider, any view we may have formed 
regarding conventional rationales for civil limitation laws. As argued 
elsewhere (Ross, 2018), such laws often give primacy to the interests 
of alleged wrongdoers and to the need to protect alleged  
wrongdoers from civil law redress in a context in which the ordinary 
justification for such laws is weak when weighed  against  the 
enormity of the injury caused by the abuses complained of and the 
acute difficulties victims often face in pursuing timely enforcement 
action in respect of the childhood rights allegedly violated. For this 
and other reasons, it may not be productive to view the civil law 
claims of adult survivors of childhood abuse exclusively in terms of 
attempts to enforce, or give effect to, some concept of “adult rights”. 
For, as also observed in a different context: 
 
[i]t may … appear trivially true to assert that rights of action 
which have accrued to children when they are children are 
rights “of the child” and that claimants who have taken up 
these rights in later life, as adults, are seeking to enforce and 
give effect to such children’s rights. It is important to view the 
matter in terms of this shift of perspective otherwise we may 
misconstrue the denial of such rights as something other than 
the denial of children’s rights. (Ross, 2013, p. 258) 
 
Children’s rights – especially those (whether derivable from civil or 
criminal laws) that afford some level of protection to children from 
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physical and psychological violations – may be thought to be 
qualitatively different from “adult rights”, given (in particular) that 
children’s rights are often dependent on adult agency for their fullest 
realisation. For some, however, this may be a false dichotomy or an 
over-simplification as equivalences in the positions of the very young 
(i.e. infants) and the very old (i.e. elderly adults) provide test cases  
for the identification, at a deeper level of engagement, of meaningful 
frames of reference for understanding such matters as the apparent 
antinomy of children’s rights versus “adult rights” (see, for example, 
Campbell, 1992; and Goodin and Gibson, 1997, p. 186). To that end, 
the concepts of agency, autonomy and choice have often provided 
credible points of departure (see, on autonomy in particular, 
Freeman, 1992; Lowy, 1992; and Brighouse and Swift, 2006, p. 83); 
while other, or overlapping, frames of reference turn on specifically 
identified children’s rights – such as rights of provision, protection 
and participation (see, for example, Thomas 2007; and Quennerstedt, 
2010). 
 
At a more practical level, however – particularly in the context of the 
present discussion – judges may be faced with quite challenging 
questions, such as ‘what is an appropriate exercise of judicial 
discretion involving individuals at this or that stage in their 
development?’; or ‘what is an appropriate judicial decision involving 
someone beset by this or that handicap’ (e.g. those mentioned in 
section 3, above). The problematic or unique nature of children’s 
rights, coupled with the special vulnerability of children, surely 
necessitate a difference in judicial approach which recognises,  
reflects and responds to relevant qualitative and other differences in 
rights. 
 
Thus, in critical situations such as where an exercise of judicial 
discretion may be called for – for example, in the context of exercises 
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of the so-called section 19A discretion under Scots limitation law 
(discussed above) and other judicial decision-making involving the 
possibility of disapplying civil limitation laws in historical childhood 
abuse cases – it is surely inappropriate, and could even be regarded 
as representing a denial of justice, if civil law claims  are disposed of 
by treating claimants as if at all times they had been possessed of 
adult invulnerabilities and resiliencies (judicially imputed to them) 
that entirely fail to reflect the existential and historical realities of the 
experiences undergone by the claimants concerned (where directly 
relevant to the case in hand), and at the same time misinterpret or 
misrepresent the psychological and emotional makeup of those 
claimants (where that too is relevant). 
 
5.2 Contrasting Attitudes: English Law and Scots Law Judicial 
Decision-Making 
 
The case law reviewed in this article appears to point to a relatively 
accommodating and sympathetic approach towards adult personal 
injury claims brought by adults in relation to allegations of historical 
childhood abuse when made under English law, especially in more 
recent cases relying on the so-called section 33 discretion. In  
contrast, under Scots law a more uncompromising and casuistic 
approach to judicial decision-making has been discernible: not only in 
cases relying on the so-called section 19A discretion; but more 
generally. In the recent past, the often intractable difficulties faced  
by adult survivors of childhood abuse in pursuing timely civil law 
redress have only rarely been given appropriate judicial recognition 
by the courts in Scotland. For instance, as we have seen, in a leading 
case the courts retreated from the task of constructing a workable 
judicial paradigm embodying some of the core characteristics and 
vulnerabilities of typical claimants whose fragile psychological or 
emotional     makeup     (often     shaped     by     injurious     childhood 
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experiences), adverse life circumstances and insecure financial 
position (among other factors) ordinarily prevent them from pursuing 
timely civil law redress. 
 
The courts in the UK have also at times had the task of deciding on 
the postponement of the running of an applicable limitation period 
based on a claimant’s unawareness that injury caused by historical 
childhood abuse was sufficiently serious to justify pursuing civil law 
redress. When relevant claims have come before the courts in 
Scotland, acute and arguably unnecessary difficulties have been 
created for claimants. We have seen that judicial assumptions have 
been made that are unrealistic or unworkable for many claimants; 
and this has gone hand in hand with judicial expectations that most 
claimants, from any practical standpoint, would find impossible to 
meet: for instance, the idea that abuse victims might pursue civil law 
redress while still in adolescence. On the question of whether the 
court’s determination of awareness is to be on the basis of a 
claimant’s actual awareness or an “objective” judicial attribution of 
awareness, arguably English law has struck a realistic balance 
between the respective domains of the subjective and the objective. 
The dominant approach of the Scottish courts has been the adoption 
of an entirely objective or imputed judicial assessment of awareness 
that for all practical purposes erases and renders irrelevant any 
element of the actual awareness of the claimant. 
 
As we have seen, the perception, in the public consciousness, of a 
certain hardness of judicial attitude and approach to relevant claims 
in Scotland necessitated the introduction of legislation by the  
Scottish Parliament in 2017: the Limitation (Childhood Abuse) 
(Scotland) Act 2017. But – as also mentioned above – the legislation, 
while removing the literal time-bar from operating in historical 
childhood   abuse   civil   law   claims   appears   to   give   scope   for 
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reawakening (indeed, possibly reinvigorating) previous case law by 
establishing grounds of challenge that are specific to childhood abuse 
claims under sections 17D(2) and 17D(3) of the Prescription and 
Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973: respectively, a fair hearing test and a 
substantial prejudice test. At the time of writing of this article, no 
cases have been reported where these challenges  have  been 
invoked, so it remains to be seen whether the courts will adopt an 
approach where, more often than not, the interests of the  
challenging party (the party sued) are given primacy over those of the 
party suing. 
 
Although there have been calls for legislation similar to Scotland’s 
2017 Act to be introduced south of the border (Scorer, 2016) not only 
has this not yet happened but it is arguable whether it is actually 
necessary given that in several landmark decisions such as Hoare and 
cases following thereon – including separate key developments in 
vicarious liability (such as Catholic Child Welfare Society and others v 
The Institute of the Brothers of the Christian Schools) – the position of 
adult claimants in historical childhood abuse cases has markedly 
improved; while, in general, the operation of civil limitation laws in 
relevant cases seems fair and not disproportionately weighted in 
favour of alleged wrongdoers. 
 
5.3 Looking ahead 
 
 
Ultimately, a right conferred by law that is for all practical purposes 
incapable of being exercised or enforced is on a par with a law that – 
according to Lon L. Fuller’s principles of the “internal morality” of law 
– is beyond the power of anyone to observe or comply with (Fuller, 
1969, pp. 33–38). It so happens that the rights under discussion in  
this article centre upon violations of the emotional, physical, 
psychological and sexual integrity of the most vulnerable members of 
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society. The case for maintaining such rights – and related 
compensatory rights – beyond the reach of civil limitation laws for as 
long as it takes for potential claimants to overcome inhibitions  
around the pursuit of civil law redress therefore represents not only a 
practical and logistical necessity but arguably a moral imperative. 
Without doubt that position appears to have been embraced under 
English law in decisions emerging at the highest level of the judicial 
system. So far as Scots law is concerned, it remains to be seen how 
the courts will respond to the 2017 Act. But if, going forward,  
reliance on the new grounds of challenge now enshrined in the 
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 simply leads to a 
continuation of the hardline approach already established by the 
courts in Scotland over a number of years, that will indeed be a 
retrograde step, and (particularly if the spirit of the 2017 Act is 
suppressed) will represent something of a retreat from the judicial 
responsibility to uphold and take seriously very significant rights of 
the child. 
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